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Abstract—EM injection recently emerged as an effective
medium for fault injection. This paper presents an analysis
of the IC susceptibility to EM pulses. It highlights that faults
produced by EM pulse injection are not timing faults but
correspond to a different model which is presented in this
paper. This model also allows to explain experimental results
introduced in former communications.
Keywords-EM Fault Injection; EM fault model
I. INTRODUCTION
Besides power and ElectroMagnetic (EM) analyses [6],
[5], fault injection constitutes [2] a serious threat against
secure circuits. Among the means used to inject faults
within cryptographic IC, the laser [11] is undoubtedly
the most popular because of its high spatial and temporal
resolutions. However, fault injection with laser is facing
difﬁculties. Among them one can identify the increasing
number of metal layers (up to 12 levels) used to rout
signals in a chip; this may prevent from the use of laser
to inject fault through the frontside. The second difﬁculty
one may point out is the long practice of laser injection
and the related and progressive development of more and
more efﬁcient countermeasures like embedded laser shot
detectors. It is therefore not surprising that adversaries are
looking for new mediums for injecting faults.
Two fault injection means appeared recently. One of
them is the injection of a voltage spike directly into the
substrate of the targeted IC to produce ground bounces or
voltage drops according to the polarity of the spike [12].
The other is EM injection which, despite the early warning
of Quisquater et al. in 2002 [8], did only ﬁnd recently a
larger echo in the scientiﬁc bibliography despite its inherent
advantages: ability to inject faults through the package and
the frontside being the most important as highlighted in
[10] in which a high frequency spark gap is used to produce
faults in a CRT-RSA .
Two types of EM injection platforms can be mounted
to induce faults into IC. Harmonic EM injection platform
refers to the ﬁrst type. It produces sine EM waves, that can
be modulated in amplitude or not, to produce faults. Such
type of platform has been reported efﬁcient in [7] to disturb
the behavior of an internal clock generator and in [1] to
bias a true random number generator.
EM Pulse (EMP) platform refers to the second type
of platform which is detailed in section II. It produces a
single but powerful EMP that creates a sudden current
ﬂow in the power/ ground networks of IC and therefore
voltage drops and/or ground bounces. Such type of platform
was ﬁrst reported efﬁcient in [3] to inject faults into an
old microcontroller designed with a 350nm technology.
The analysis of the fault obtained using such a platform
was conducted in [4]. This paper concludes that EM
injection produces timing faults and more precisely setup
time constraint violations. As a result of this observation,
a delay-based glitch detector was evaluated against EM
injection in [13] and demonstrated partially efﬁcient.
If the results reported in [3] are convincing, they limit de
facto the interest of EMP for injecting faults into smartcards.
Indeed, nowadays smartcards are typically designed with
the 90nm process and operate at a reduced clock frequency
(< 40MHz). They are therefore characterized by large
timing slacks (i.e. time margins between a circuit critical
time and the clock period). They are thus quite robust to
EM injection (considering the ranges and the slew rates of
modern high speed voltage generators) if the latter does
only produce timing faults. Indeed, producing timing faults
in such circuits requires the use of extremely powerful pulse
generator to produce sufﬁciently intense EMP. Additionally
producing such EMP reduces the spatial resolution of EM
injections.
To broaden the range of IC on which the EM injection
is effective, [9] has shown that with probes focusing the
magnetic ﬁeld on a small part of IC surface it is possible
to create bitsets, bitresets, single byte or mylti-bytes faults
or even single bit faults. However, for their experimental
demonstration, the authors targeted an IC in which the clock
is intentionally during EM injections to avert the occurrence
of timing faults. If the demonstration that EM injection
can produce some bitsets and bitresets is convincing, one
question remains. What types of fault appear preferentially
when injections are performed while the Device Under Test
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(DUT) operates: bitsets, bitresets, timing faults or a mixture
of all types?
Within this context, this paper aims at contributing to
the State of the Art on EM injection by showing that
faults produced within an IC while it operates are neither
bitsets, nor bitresets or timing faults, but are what we call
’sampling faults’. These errors result from the disturbance
of the D-type Flip-Flop (DFF) sampling process. As a
second contribution, this paper shows that EM injection
is local, much more than expected and reported in former
works such as [3], [9].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II shows the equipment used to carry out the
experimental demonstration that EM injection produces sam-
pling faults. Section III recalls the fundamentals related to
synchronous IC, their operation and the associated sources
of faults. Section IV deﬁnes the experiments as well as their
goals and gives the obtained results. Finally, a conclusion is
drawn in section V.
II. EM INJECTION SETUP
This section describes the equipments that have been used
to perform the experiments detailled in the rest of the paper.
It should be noticed the equipements are similar (at some
minor differences) to that presented in [9].
A. EMP-Injection platform
The EMP platform used during the experiments described
in this paper is shown Fig. 1. It features a laptop that controls
the whole platform through serial ports, a 3-axis positioning
system to place the EM injector with an accuracy of ±5μm
at the surface of the DUT, a 3-axes vision system made of
USB microscopes connected to the laptop. An oscilloscope
is also used in order to monitor the synchronization between
the EMP and the target’s operations. The pulse generator is a
main element of the platform. It delivers, to the EM injector,
a voltage pulse of amplitude Vpulse as high as 400V (current
16A), with a width that ranges between 5ns and 35ns. Its
settling times are lower than 2ns.
B. EMP-Injectors
In [9] three types of EM injectors are introduced: injectors
with ﬂat tip end, injectors with a sharpened end, and
injectors with crescent shape. Fig. 2 shows the three types
of injectors. In the remainder of this paper, we report results
obtained with two injectors with: one with a crescent shape
and the other with a ﬂathead. They are shown Fig. 2a and
c. The ﬂathead injector used during our experiments has 7
loops wound around a ferrite core with a diameter equal to
800μm. The distance, s, between the tips of the crescent-
shaped injector we used is equal to 450μm .
III. SOURCE OF FAILURE OF SYNCHRONOUS CIRCUITS
This section recalls the operation principle of synchronous
IC, its advantages and drawbacks. These recalls are done
to introduce the three main design constraints that must be
observed in order to obtain circuits operating correctly, but
also in order to list the main sources of potential faults.
A. Synchronous IC operation
A synchronous IC is a circuit in which exchanges of data
between the various building blocks are synchronized by a
global signal. This signal, the clock, orders the sampling,
at regular time intervals, of the calculation results but also
their transmission from one block to another. This design
approach, as compared to asynchronous IC design, has
two main advantages. The ﬁrst is that data exchanges are
performed at regular intervals, making the understanding of
how a circuit operates intuitive.
The second is that a synchronous IC can pass through
any logic states between sampling times ts that correspond
to the rising edges of the clock, without degradation of its
functionality provided the results to be correct and stable
at ts i.e. at the arrival of the next rising edge. Here, a logic
state means a vector formed by all the output values of all
logic gates at a given time t. This is an important advantage
of synchronous IC over asynchronous IC because it is not
necessary to check (or even list) the validity of the logic
states for the whole continuous time window (time window
2 on Fig. 3) between the sampling times ts (time window
1 on Fig. 3). Indeed, it is just necessary to check that the
IC is in a correct and steady state at ts. This is usually
achieved using Static Timing Analysis tools avalaible in
CAD suites.
B. Circuit level timing constraints
However, these advantages are accompanied by some
counterparties. All the constituting blocks of a given
IC must perform their calculations within one sampling
period, i.e. in less than one clock cycle, TCK . Some design
efforts are therefore required to integrate blocks performing
complex operations under a high clock frequency.
The second issue is that the sampling elements that are
currently integrated on silicon, the DFF, are imperfect and
are not able to sample and transfer data instantaneously.
Consequently, some constraints must be met: data must be
stable Tsetup ps before the rising edge of the clock and
remain stable Thold ps after.
These two constraints coming from the basic operation
of DFF are associated, at circuit level, to the so called
Setup and Hold time constraints reported in eq. 1 and 2
and illustrated by Fig. 3 in which appears the time window
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Figure 2. EMP-Injectors: (a) ’Flat’ Injector (b) ’Sharp’ Injector and (c) ’Crescent’ Injector
during which data must be correct and stable (regions 1).
TCK > DCK2Q +DQ2D + TSetup +DSkew (1)
DCK2Q +DQ2D > THold +DSkew (2)
In these equations, TCK stands for the clock signal period,
DCK2Q for the propagation delays of DFF, DQ2D for the
delay of the combinational blocks and DSkew for the clock
skew.
C. Sources of timing constraint violations
Given these Setup and Hold time constraints, one can
deﬁne different scenarios leading to the occurrence of a fault
produced by an EMP.
1) Timing faults.: Let us start with the one put forward
in [4]: the timing fault model. In this model, the EMP
induces a voltage drop sufﬁciently important for increasing
the propagation delay of the data, DQ2D, so that a violation
of a setup time constraint (eq. 1) occurs.
According to this model and to eq. 1, several criteria
or tests can be deﬁned to experimentally determine if EM
injection follows the timing fault model or not. Indeed,
following eq. 1, a ﬁrst test could consist in trying to avoid
the apparition of a setup constraint violation (being given an
EM injection repeated with the same settings) by reducing
the clock frequency, i.e. by increasing TCK . A second test
could consist in producing at different times tpulse within
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Figure 3. Setup timing constraint in a synchronous IC
verifying that the occurrence of the fault is independent
of that parameter. Indeed, independently to the time tpulse
at which an increase of DQ2D is produced (the beginning
of the clock period, the middle or the end) if the delay
increase is sufﬁcient a fault appears.
One may probably deﬁne other tests. However, these two
tests, denoted by TFM (Timing Fault Model) tests, afterward
were considered sufﬁcient during the experimentations
detailed in section IV-C to verify whetever EM injections
induce timing faults or not.
2) Sampling faults: This model relies on the assumption
that EM injection is able to sufﬁciently modify the amplitude
of one or several DFF input signals (D,CK,Set, Reset
in Fig. 3) during their switching (region 1 on Fig. 3) so
that the gate level setup or hold time constraint is violated;
violation that results in an erroneous sampling and/or
transfer of the input data onto the outputs. It is important
to note that violating these gate level constraints is different
to violating the related circuit level constraints deﬁned
by eq. 1 and 2. Indeed, the propagation delays and other
timing ﬁgures involved in these equations could still have
satisfactory values even if EM injection breaks the data
stability just before or during the rising clock edge.
We searched for some tests to check if the ’sampling
fault’ model is a valid EM injection model or not. For
that, similarly to what we did for the timing fault model,
we analyzed the various implications of the sampling fault
model.
Among them, one may observe that if EM injection
produces such faults then these faults can solely appear
when the EMP is produced just before or after the
occurrence of a rising clock edge (i.e. at times ts) and more
precisely during the ’sampling windows’ corresponding to
the effective switching of DFF. Additionally, if this EM
fault model is valid, these time windows (denoted afterward
by ’susceptibility windows’) during which EM injection is
able to produce faults, are :
• periodic with a period equal to TCK and have a width
independent of the clock frequency. Indeed, Tsetup and
Thold depend only of intrinsic parameters related to the
design of DFF (such as schematic, layout, technology
or supply voltage ...).
• are necessarily separated by time slots during which the
probability to produce a fault is null if the ’sampling
model’ is correct; these windows are corresponding
to EM injections that do not fall within the EM
susceptibility window of DFF.
All these interesting implications of the ’sampling model’
deﬁne the SFM (Sampling Fault Model) test were used to
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Figure 4. DUT ﬂoorplan
check if EM injection produces sampling faults during the
experimentations described in section IV.
IV. OBJECTIVES AND RELATED EXPERIMENTATIONS
This section describes, ﬁrst, the DUT used during our
experiments. Secondly, it describes the experiments we did
to determine which model is valid among the timing fault
model and the sampling fault model. Thirdly, the results of
these experiments are presented and analyzed.
A. Device Under Test
The DUT adopted to conduct our experiments is an FPGA
(xilinx Spartan 3E-1000), designed with a 90nm process, on
which four functional blocks have been mapped. The ﬁrst
is a Finite State Machine (FSM) operating at 50MHz. It
controls all the events and contains registers for storing the
encryption / decryption result and the ciphering key. The
second is a Digital Clock Manager (DCM) providing on
command a frequency of 100MHz, 50MHz or 25MHz to
the third block. The third block is an AES-128bits. It ciphers
a plaintext in 10 rounds at either 100MHz, 50MHz or at
25MHz. Finally, the fourth block is an RS232 enabling
communications between the ﬁnite state machine and the
outside of the circuit. The ﬂoorplan of the circuit, which was
established under constraint to separate the block is visible
Fig. 4. These design constraints were ﬁxed to enable the
analysis of EM injection effects spatially.
B. Objectives
If in the previous paragraphs, the focus was put on the
various possible fault models, one of the ﬁrst questions
we addressed is the location of faults that are produced,
injection being delivered during the ninth round of
the AES. Mappings revealing the probability to induce
a fault have been therefore established for the DUT
described above. The obtained faults were also analyzed
to reveal their nature (multi-bits, single bit ...), the number
of faulted bytes or again the injector positions leading
to disrupt each of the sixteen bytes manipulated by the AES.
Following these preliminary experiments, EM injection
campaigns were conducted with the injector placed at se-
lected positions above the DUT. These campaigns aimed at
applying the TFM and SFM tests deﬁned in section III to
identify which model is the most relevant.
C. Experimental results
This section describes the experimental results and the
protocols that have been followed to obtain them.
1) Experiment no 1: locality of the EMP injection.:
The mappings revealing the probability to induce a fault,
with both types of injectors, were obtained by performing
at each coordinate (x, y) 100 injections with 10 plaintexts
randomly selected before launching the experiments. These
EMP injections were acheived by providing to the injectors
a voltage pulse of amplitude Vpulse = 44V and a pulse
width PW = 8ns. The end(s) of the injectors were in
contact with the IC surface. The operating frequency of the
AES was ﬁxed at 100MHz and the core supply voltage
V dd was set to 1.2V , the nominal voltage of the DUT.
The mappings performed with the ﬂathead injector were
achieved with a displacement step δx = δy = 200μm.
Those performed with the ’crescent’ injector with
δx = 100μm and δy = 100μm. Fig. 5a and b gives
the probability of inducing a fault with an EMP. In the case
of the ﬂathead injector, two types of faults were observed:
some faults were erroneous ciphertexts and other were
’no-response’. The latter case corresponds to the situation
in which the FPGA stops operating correctly and does not
provide any response either a good one or a wrong one.
Fig. 5c shows the coordinates at which ’no-response’ were
obtained. It should be noticed that only correct or erroneous
ciphertexts were obtained with the ’crescent injector’.
As can be seen Fig. 5a, EM injections performed with
the ’crescent’ injector is local. Indeed, faults are obtained
with a high probability level in disjoint areas corresponding
roughly to the ﬂoorplan adopted during the design of
the DUT. These regions correspond respectively with the
placement of the AES, the placement of the registers storing
the key and the ciphertexts, but also to the placement of the
FSM. It is interesting to notice that faults produced with
the ’crescent’ injector placed above the FSM did not stop
the circuit operation but are ’erroneous’ ciphering.
Similarly, one may observe Fig. 5b that EM injection
conducted with the ﬂathead injector are also local but
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Figure 5. Probability to induce (a) a bad ciphering with the ’crescent injector’, (b) a bad ciphering with the ﬂathead injector and (c) a ’no-response’ with
the ﬂathead injector
Byte n°1 Byte n°2 Byte n°3 Byte n°4 
Byte n°5 Byte n°6 Byte n°7 Byte n°8 
Byte n°9 Byte n°10 Byte n°11 Byte n°12 
Byte n°13 Byte n°14 Byte n°15 Byte n°16 
Figure 6. Probability to fault each byte wrt to the positioning of the ’crescent’ injector (the color scale is the same than in Fig. 5)
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that coordinates with a high level of probability are really
different to that of Fig. 5a. Indeed, there are less coordinates
on top and around the AES leading to faulty responses and
there are much more coordinates in the neighborhood of
the FSM and of the DCM leading to faults. In addition to
these spatial differences probably explained by the different
radiation diagrams of the injectors, the main divergence
between the results obtained with the two probes is the
appearance of ’no-response’. Many injections performed
with the ﬂathead injector produced a ’no response’ while
there is not with the ’crescent probe’.
If those mappings reveal the local nature of EMP
injection, this characteristic appears much more evident
when the link between the positioning of the injector and
the faulted bytes processed by the AES is analyzed. Fig.
6 gives, in case of the ’crescent injector’, the probability
to induce a fault in each of the 16 bytes processed by the
AES with respect to the positioning of the injector. As can
be seen the positioning the injector has an inﬂuence on the
fault rate at a given byte, and the positions at which it is
easy to induce a fault in given byte are different to that of
other bytes. They are of course positions at which several
bytes are faulted.
The local character of EM injection being highlighted,
and the coordinates (x, y) associated with a high probability
to induce a fault being known, the experimentations aiming
at identifying which model between the timing fault model
and the sampling fault model is the more realistic were
conducted.
2) Experiment no 2: EM Injection Fault model:
More particularly, several EM injection campaigns were
conducted with the crescent-shaped injector positioned at
three distinct coordinates characterized by a high probability
to produce faults (Fig. 5). During these injection campaigns
two experimental variables were considered.
The ﬁrst one is the operating frequency of the AES that
can be ﬁxed to three values by the DCM: FAES = 25MHz,
50MHz and 100MHz. The second experimental variable
is tpulse, i.e. the time at which the 100 EM injections are
produced (still with the same random plaintexts). The range
of tpulse values was chosen according to FAES so that to
sweep the whole execution of the AES algorithm (11 clock
cycles). It should be noted that during these experimental
campaigns, other injection parameters were kept constant
to the following values Vpulse = 44V and PW = 8ns.
The obtained results allowed to draw Fig. 7 which reports
the evolution of the number of faulted bytes with respect
to tPulse, i.e. wrt time for FAES = 100MHz. As can be
seen, time slots during which it is possible to induce a fault
appeared. These are periodically spaced by 10ns, value
that corresponds to the clock period TAES . These slots
of a duration equal to 6ns are denoted by susceptibility
windows in the rest of the paper. They are separated by
time slots during which the susceptibility to EM injection
is null.
Given these results and the two fault models established
in section III, it seems that the more realistic EM injection
model is the sampling fault model and not the timing fault
model. Indeed, if observed faults were timing faults, there
would not be time slots during which no fault is induced
because the time at which the increase in delay caused by
the EM injection begins does not condition the occurrence
of a fault.
However, to better sustain this result, these experiments
were repeated over the last three rounds of the AES
successively clocked at FAES = 100MHz, 50MHz and
ﬁnally 25MHz. Fig. 8 shows, for the three clock frequency
values, the evolutions of the probability to induce a fault.
Observing these evolutions shows that the apparition of
the susceptibility windows is independent of clock period
and that the width of this window is constant and equal to
6ns. Additionally, one may observe that the duration of
the time slots during which no fault is produced increases
linearly with the clock period: the duration of these time
slots moving from 34ns at FAES = 25MHz to 4ns at
FAES = 100MHz. These observations conﬁrm that the
more realistic fault model for EM injection is the sampling
fault model.
If these experiments are sufﬁcient to demonstrate that
obtained faults are of type ’sampling fault’, in the case of
the AES mapped onto an FPGA, similar experiments were
performed on a modern 32-bit micro controller. The aim
was to verify that the sampling fault model is not speciﬁc
to the FPGA. This micro-controller is designed in a 90nm
process, features an internal voltage regulator to maintain
the core supply voltage at 1.2V . Its main constituting
block is an ARM cortex M4 processor clocked at 30MHz.
This micro-controller also embeds a hardware AES-128bits
clocked at 120MHz (TCK = 8.33ns).
Fig. 9 gives the probability to induce a fault for three
values of Vpulse: 120V , 160V et 190V . The time slot on
which the EM injections have been performed corresponds
to three rounds of the AES. As can be seen, the observed
behavior is similar to that found in the case of the FPGA.
Three susceptibility windows, spaced by TAES = 8.3ns are
clearly visible, indeed. However, they are of a duration that
varies from 2.9ns to 4.25ns with Vpulse. These durations
are lower than in the case of the FPGA (6ns). A likely
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Figure 8. Evolution of the probability to induce a fault into the hardware AES mapped onto a spartan3-1000 wrt tpulse
delay of DCK2Q of the DFF which is signiﬁcantly shorter
in the case of the ASIC (350ps) that in the case of FPGA
(1ns). More detail is given in the following paragraphs.
Finally, these windows are more rounded than in the case of
AES mapped onto the FPGA. This is mainly explained by
a small timing jitter observed on the actual value of tpulse;
the injection timing being less reliable than in the case of
the FPGA for which the clock signal is constructed from is
an external clock source (a quartz) and not a PLL as for the
micro-controller.
D. Synthesizing results related to the EMP Injection Model
Given the experiments and observations described in this
paper, it seems that the fault model associated with the
injection is the ’sampling fault’ model, i.e. the disruption of
the switching process of DFF, an event that can be induced
at every rising clock edge. However, the authors of [9]
postponed the possibility of inducing bitsets and bitresets
on a circuit for which the clock signal is turned off, i.e.
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Figure 9. Evolution of the probability to inject a fault into the hardware AES embedded in the 32bit micro controller wrt tPulse
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Figure 10. The sampling fault model
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Given these two observations on the same type of circuit
(xilinx Spartan3-1000) and with the same equipment but
with different pulse amplitudes (44V in this paper and more
than 100V in [9]), we propose in this section a description
of what could be the ’sampling’ fault model, which appears
the more realistic for EM injection. The latter is illustrated
Fig. 10.
In this Fig. 10 appears in the upper right corner a picture
of EMP generated with the system described in section II
for increasing Vpulse values; these EMP were measured
with a Langer probe. As shown, a voltage pulse produces
two EMP: one positive and one negative associated to
the rising and falling edges of the voltage pulse. The ﬁrst
one has typically a higher amplitude (in absolute value)
than the ﬁrst one. One may also observe that increasing
Vpulse is equivalent to increase the amplitude of the EMP
without increasing their width. It is assumed for shake of
simplicity hereafter, that Vpulse is a direct measure of the
EMP amplitude. This is equivalent to consider an ideal EM
coupling between the injector and the DUT.
In Fig. 10, are also reported two threshold voltage values,
Vthhigh et Vthlow, associated to the EM sucsceptibility of
a DFF. Vthhigh is the minimum amplitude of the EMP that
must be produced to induce a fault, i.e. a bitset or bitreset,
in DFF at rest. Vthlow represents the minimum amplitude
of the EMP that must be produced to induce a fault during
the switching of a DFF. Of course, these threshold voltage
values depend on many design parameters of the considered
DFF but also of the Device Under Test that is deﬁning the
quality of the EM coupling between the injector and the
DUT. It is also obvious that Vthhigh > Vthlow.
As illustrated, Fig. 10, such considerations are sufﬁcient
to explain the apparition of susceptibility windows when
EM injections are performed with moderated values
(Vthhigh > Vpulse > Vthlow ) of Vpulse. Indeed, if the
EMP are falling out of the time slot during which the DFF
are switching, no fault is induced. Contrarily, for EMP
falling within this time slot, there is a high probability to
induce a fault. This is illustrated Fig. 10 in which appears
a susceptibility window of width Δt = 10ns, the time
during which the ﬁrst (positive) EMP is greater than Vthlow
neglecting the switching time of the DFF (350ps).
Now, if EM injections are performed with high enough
values of Vpulse (Vpulse > Vthhigh ), fault appear indepen-
dently of the tpulse value, i.e. even if the clock signal is
disabled as in [9]. In that case, the probability to induce a
fault is constant over time and depends, in practice, only on
the existence of a sufﬁcient EM coupling between the EM
injector and the DUT. This is illustrated Fig. 10 by the red
line.
V. CONCLUSION
Several EM injection campaigns were performed on an
FPGA and a modern 32bit micro controller, both embedding
a hardware AES-128bits. If these experiments have shown
that EM injection is local, they have mainly contributed to
highlight that the EM injections performed with a moderated
power do not produce timing faults but disrupt the switching
process of DFF. These observations, together with those
described in [9], postponing the possibility of producing and
bitsets or bitresets in DFF at rest, led to propose a speciﬁc
EM fault model: the sampling fault model.
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